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ABSTRACT
This Article reveals interdependent legal and technical loopholes that
the US intelligence community could use to circumvent constitutional
and statutory safeguards for Americans. These loopholes involve the
collection of Internet traffic on foreign territory, and leave Americans
as unprotected as foreigners by current United States (US) surveillance
laws. This Article will also describe how modern Internet protocols can
be manipulated to deliberately divert American’s traffic abroad, where
traffic can then be collected under a more permissive legal regime (Ex-
ecutive Order 12333) that is overseen solely by the executive branch of
the US government. Although the media has reported on some of the
techniques we describe, we cannot establish the extent to which these
loopholes are exploited in practice.
An actionable short-term remedy to these loopholes involves updating
the antiquated legal definition of “electronic surveillance” in the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), that has remained largely
intact since 1978. In the long term, however, a fundamental reconsider-
ation of established principles in US surveillance law is required, since
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these loopholes cannot be closed by technology alone. Legal issues that
require reconsideration include the determination of applicable law by
the geographical point of collection of network traffic, the lack of gen-
eral constitutional or statutory protection for network-traffic collection
before users are “intentionally targeted,” and the fact that constitu-
tional protection under the Fourth Amendment is limited to “US per-
sons” only. The combination of these three principles results in high
vulnerability for Americans when the US intelligence community col-
lects Americans’ network traffic abroad.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the string of revelations on surveillance operations conducted
by the United States (US) intelligence community has overloaded the gen-
eral public and the media, we are only beginning the process of precisely
describing the legal and technical details behind these operations. This
multi-disciplinary Article discusses interdependent legal and technical loop-
holes that US intelligence agencies could use to circumvent Fourth Amend-
ment protections and statutory safeguards for Americans.
There are several loopholes in current US surveillance law that allow for
largely unrestrained surveillance on Americans by collecting their network
traffic abroad while not intentionally targeting a US person. Because the US
legal framework regulating intelligence operations has not been updated to
account for new technical realities, the loopholes we identify could leave
Americans’ Internet traffic as exposed to network surveillance and as unpro-
tected, from a legal perspective, as foreigners’ Internet traffic.
This Article aims to broaden the understanding of how technical reali-
ties of the Internet impact US surveillance law and suggest remedies that can
close the loopholes identified. This Article focuses on surveillance opera-
tions conducted by US government agencies but does not speculate on the
extent to which the intelligence community is exploiting the loopholes iden-
tified. This Article also does not address the morality of surveillance based
on the (assumed) nationality of Internet users.
This analysis fits into a recurring regulatory conundrum. The application
of any law is, ultimately, tied to jurisdiction. For centuries, jurisdiction has
been determined primarily by geographic borders, or the physical space that
states consider sovereign territory. Because global communication networks
do not necessarily respect such borders, regulators and courts across the
globe are struggling to adapt law to this new technical reality. Transnational
surveillance (i.e., surveillance conducted from one country, directed towards
users in another country) on global communications networks presents us
with one of the most urgent examples of this conundrum.1
Although short term technical and legal solutions are available to ad-
dress some of the issues outlined in this Article, they are no panacea. In the
end, safeguarding the privacy of American Internet users requires a recon-
sideration of three legal principles underlying US surveillance law. First, the
geographical point of collection determines which legal regime applies to a
surveillance operation. Second, the collection of network traffic, before
processing and analysis, is not firmly protected by the Fourth Amendment of
1. See generally Joris van Hoboken, Axel Arnbak, & Nico van Eijk, Obscured by
Clouds, or How to Address Governmental Access to Cloud Data from Abroad (June 7, 2013)
(conference paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2276103
(discussing the issue of transnational surveillance on global communications networks
extensively).
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the US Constitution. Third, constitutional protection is limited to “US per-
sons,” a term that is not defined uniformly across different regimes of US
surveillance laws. These principles emerged in different times than ours. If
they are maintained, loopholes in antiquated law—particularly Executive
Order (EO) 12333—will work in conjunction with ever-advancing technical
capabilities to enable largely unrestrained surveillance on Americans from
abroad.
This Article focuses on network traffic surveillance conducted from
abroad in the data collection phase, although at times we point to policies for
data retention and subsequent analysis as well. Part I describes the three
legal regimes that form the core regulatory framework for network traffic
collection by intelligence agencies. Part II discusses the technical details of
how network protocols can be exploited to conduct surveillance from
abroad, thus circumventing the legal protections in place for Americans
when operations are conducted on US soil. Part III briefly reflects on possi-
ble legal and technical remedies.
METHODOLOGY. Our research combines descriptive, internal legal analy-
sis with threat-modeling from computer science. In addition to reaching in-
ter-disciplinary conclusions, we aim to offer academics a new analytical
framework to conduct similar research. Our method should be particularly
helpful for conducting research on the interdependency of the laws and tech-
nologies for network surveillance and conducting evaluations of surveillance
law as part of policymaking.
LEGAL ANALYSIS. Part I describes the current US regulatory framework
for intelligence gathering. Three legal regimes are most relevant to this
Article:
1. Surveillance of domestic communications records conducted on
US soil under § 215 of the Patriot Act;2
2. Surveillance of international communications conducted on US
soil under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA);3
and
3. Surveillance conducted entirely abroad under Executive Or-
der 12333 (EO 12333)4 and underlying policies, notably
2. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
3. See generally Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
4. See generally Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, H.R. 4681, 113th
Cong. § 309 (2014); Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1981); Exec. Order No. 13,284,
68 Fed. Reg. 4,075 (Jan. 23, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13,355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,593 (Aug. 27,
2004); Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (July 30, 2008).
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the US Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID
18).5
Distinguishing factors include where the surveillance is conducted and
whom a surveillance operation targets. All three branches of the US govern-
ment oversee the first two regimes, and have been discussed at length by the
government, media, and general public. The third regime, however, is solely
the domain of the executive branch and has only recently begun to receive
some attention in policy, media, and academic arenas. EO 12333, adopted in
1981 by the Reagan Administration and not substantially updated since,
forms the cornerstone of this legal analysis; indeed, the NSA states that EO
12333 is the “primary legal authority” for its operations.6
Working with primary legal sources, many of which have only recently
been made public and are still redacted on key issues, we make the follow-
ing central observation: if an intelligence agency can construct plausible pre-
sumptions that surveillance does not “intentionally target” a US person and
when the surveillance is conducted abroad, the permissive legal regime
under EO 12333 applies. Under EO 12333, operations from abroad can be
presumed to affect foreigners rather than Americans. Since the Supreme
Court has consistently held that foreigners do not enjoy constitutional pro-
tection under US law,7 the legal incentives to conduct surveillance under EO
12333 are substantial.
The legal notion of “targeting a US person” does not rule out bulk col-
lection of Internet traffic, even in situations where the traffic actually con-
tains millions of Americans’ communication records. By collecting the
traffic abroad, authorities can presume the traffic belongs to foreigners. Any
US person’s traffic that happens to be captured during bulk collection is
considered “incidentally collected” and may be retained for further process-
ing. Users are only “targeted,” in the legal sense, once collection is complete
and the surveillance operation moves into its retention and analysis phases.
Indeed, documents revealed on August 25, 2014 indicate that metadata from
retained traffic can be shared between multiple intelligence agencies, includ-
ing domestic law enforcement and the Drug Enforcement Agency, and used
for purposes that include “target development.”8
5. See generally NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, U.S. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIREC-
TIVE SP 0018, LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND U.S. PERSONS MINIMIZATION (2011) [hereinafter “US-
SID 18”].
6. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, MEMORANDUM: THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY:
MISSIONS, AUTHORITIES, OVERSIGHT AND PARTNERSHIPS at 2–3 (2013), available at https://
www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/speeches_testimonies/2013_08_09_the_nsa_story.pdf.
7. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138 (2013); United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
8. Ryan Gallagher, Sharing Communications Metadata Across the U.S. Intelligence
Community, THE INTERCEPT, at slide 6, August 25, 2014, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/doc-
ument/2014/08/25/sharing-communications-metadata-across-u-s-intelligence-community;
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Thus, collecting Americans’ network traffic abroad creates a legal loop-
hole for surveillance on them. A surveillance operation acting in a manner
consistent with EO 12333 allows foreignness to be presumed for data that is
intercepted abroad. This circumvents Americans’ Fourth Amendment pro-
tections that are assumed (in the legal sense) to be US persons under FISA
and § 215 of the Patriot Act during domestic surveillance operations.9
As of July 2014, the lack of public scrutiny of EO 12333 seems to have
shifted. When the first public version of this Article was posted online prior
to its presentation at the 2014 Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium,
a range of media outlets reported on our findings. Coverage on CBS
News10 spurred an inadequate official response from the NSA compliance
department; we discuss this response further in Part I.C.4 of this Article. A
few weeks later, a Washington Post editorial by John Napier Tye, who
served in the State Department from 2011 to 2014, argued:
Based in part on classified facts that I am prohibited by law from
publishing, I believe that Americans should be even more con-
cerned about the collection and storage of their communications
under Executive Order 12333 than under Section 215. . . . Consider
the possibility that Section 215 collection does not represent the
outer limits of collection on US persons but rather is a mechanism
to backfill that portion of US person data that cannot be collected
overseas under 12333.11
  On July 23, 2014, the executive agency’s Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (“PCLOB”) confirmed that it will investigate surveillance
policy and operations based on EO 12333.12 Given the complexity of US
surveillance law and especially EO 12333, the investigation is expected to
take months and underscores the necessity of inter-disciplinary research on
EO 12333 policy and operations.
TECHNICAL REALITIES. Part II explores why network traffic can easily be
routed or stored abroad where it can then be collected under the permissive
legal regime of EO 12333. We already know of surveillance programs that
Ryan Gallagher, The Surveillance Engine: How the NSA Built its Own Secret Google, THE
INTERCEPT, August 25, 2014, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-se-
cret-google-crisscross-proton/.
9. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(5) (2012).
10. See Zack Whittaker, Legal Loopholes Could Allow Wider NSA Surveillance, Re-
searchers Say, CBS NEWS (June 30, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/legal-
loopholes-could-let-nsa-surveillance-circumvent-fourth-amendment-researchers-say/.
11. John Napier Tye, Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan Rule That Lets The
NSA Spy On Americans, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-ameri-
cans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html.
12. See Transcript, Public Meeting 202-220-4158, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVER-
SIGHT BOARD (July 23, 2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/20140723-Transcript.pdf.
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have exploited this loophole. The MUSCULAR/TURMOIL program, for ex-
ample, illustrates how the NSA assumed authority under EO 12333 to ac-
quire traffic between Google and Yahoo! servers located on foreign
territory; this program allegedly collected up to 180 million user records
(including those of Americans) per month abroad.13
Part II also discusses other technical means an intelligence agency, us-
ing the legal loopholes in EO 12333, might exploit. Instead of eavesdropping
on intradomain traffic (i.e., data sent within a network belonging to a single
organization, as in the MUSCULAR/TURMOIL program), these loopholes
can be exploited in the interdomain setting, where traffic traverses networks
belonging to different organizations. Interdomain routing with Border Gate-
way Protocol (BGP) can naturally cause traffic originating in a US network
to be routed abroad, even when it is destined for an endpoint located on US
soil. Additionally, core Internet protocols—BGP and the Domain Name Sys-
tem (DNS)—can be deliberately manipulated to force traffic originating in
American networks to be routed abroad. These deliberate manipulations can
fall within the permissive EO 12333 regime and used to collect, in bulk, all
Internet traffic (including metadata and content) sent between a pair of net-
works, even if both networks are located on US soil.
REMEDIES. Part III explores possible legal and technical remedies. Re-
form of the Patriot Act and FISA will not close the international surveillance
loopholes identified in this Article. The focus on the Patriot Act and FISA
may be attributed to the legal fact that the legislative and judicial branches of
the US government have little authority over EO 12333 reform, since EO
12333 authority falls solely under the executive branch. Thus, surveillance
operations conducted abroad under EO 12333 have thus far been overlooked
by reform efforts, despite the fact that they may affect millions of Ameri-
cans’ privacy.
I. LOOPHOLES IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In this Part, we use recently revealed and declassified primary legal
sources to describe and contextualize the US legal framework for network
surveillance by intelligence agencies. This discussion highlights the differ-
ences in legal protection under the different legal regimes for network traffic
collection and reflects on the outlook for reform.
Before we analyze specific legal regimes, it is critical to emphasize that
non-US persons do not enjoy the protections of the Fourth Amendment of
the US Constitution. The Supreme Court first established this in United
13. See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links To Yahoo, Google
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States v. Verdugo-Urquidez14 and recently confirmed it in Clapper v. Am-
nesty International USA a.o.15 The legal and technical loopholes we identify
fundamentally rely on this principle because it profoundly impacts the statu-
tory regimes for network surveillance.
Under the current US legal framework, two main inquiries determine
which of the three legal regimes regulate network traffic collection: where
the communication is taking place (inside or outside the US) and who is
targeted. This analysis is focused on the poorly-understood third regime, EO
12333, which primarily regulates intelligence community operations on for-
eign territory.16
We start by analyzing the types of operations that fall under the legal
regimes of the Patriot Act and FISA, since EO 12333 covers operations that
are not addressed by the first two legal regimes.17 EO 12333 (and its under-
lying policies) are then examined in detail. The Order applies when surveil-
lance does not “intentionally target a US person” and is conducted abroad,
regardless of whether or not the operation actually affects the communica-
tions records of Americans.
Our legal analysis is consistent with a recently released NSA slide titled
“SIGINT Authority decision tree,” revealed by the Washington Post on July
23, 2014 (after an earlier version of this Article was first posted online) and
shown in Figure 1, below:18
14. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). The case concerned
a warrantless search of a Mexican citizen’s house, in Mexico, suspected of drug trafficking.
See also infra note 232.
15. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013); see supra note 10. The
case was brought by several civil society groups, claiming the unconstitutionality of warrant-
less bulk surveillance of their international communications. See also van Hoboken et al.,
supra note 1 at 8; infra note 232.
16. We focus on operations conducted abroad. But as we note in Part I.C.2, infra, EO
12333 also seems to have been interpreted to enable domestic operations not covered by the
other two legal regimes.
17. See discussion infra Parts I.B.2, I.C.2.
18. See Ellen Nakashima & Ashkan Soltani, Privacy Watchdog’s Next Target: the
Least-Known but Biggest Aspect of NSA Surveillance, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 23, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/07/23/privacy-watchdogs-next-tar-
get-the-least-known-but-biggest-aspect-of-nsa-surveillance/. Most elements of the flowchart
are discussed throughout this section. We will not, however, further discuss the “Second
Party” reference, understood to point at the so-called “Five Eyes” nation coalition: the US,
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. For earlier analysis on how allied na-
tions allow one another to conduct surveillance on each other’s citizens under lowered legal
standards, and subsequently obtain or share the information under classified bilateral agree-
ments, see van Hoboken et al., supra note 1, at 17–18.
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FIGURE 1. FLOWCHART SHOWING NSA SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
The location of the collection site and the target’s nationality are key
elements that determine the applicable legal regime. The less explicit ele-
ments of targeting and presumed foreignness, however, are essential to un-
derstanding the flowchart and are discussed throughout the remainder of this
Article.
First, surveillance operations that collect network traffic in bulk do not
necessarily “intentionally target a US person” in the legal sense. Put differ-
ently, “targeting” a person (as noted in the decision tree depicted in Fig-
ure 1) often occurs after the collection phase (i.e., after network traffic has
already been intercepted). Upon collection, surveillance operations move
into the retention and analysis phases; it is in these phases that users are
actually “targeted” in the legal sense. Most of this discussion centers on the
collection phase. The collection phase is crucially important, since large
volumes of Americans’ communications records can be captured during col-
lection and subsequently stored, searched, or shared with other government
agencies.19
Second, under the current US surveillance framework, conducting net-
work traffic collection operations from abroad creates the presumption that
19. See Tye, supra note 11. The revelations of August 25, 2014 indicate that searches of
these records is not limited to the N.S.A, but can also be performed by agencies including
domestic law enforcement and the Drug Enforcement Agency. See supra note 8.
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traffic belongs to foreigners: a presumption that holds even though the traffic
might, in fact, belong largely to Americans.20
A. Patriot Act § 215: Domestic Communications and
Surveillance on US Soil
Some intelligence operations target and surveil domestic communica-
tions on US soil. Under § 215 of the Patriot Act, intelligence agencies can
request a warrant at the FISA Court for “tangible things” that are “relevant”
to authorized terrorism or counterintelligence investigations.21 The current
form of § 215 was adopted shortly after the 9/11 attacks and broadened the
legal authority for domestic surveillance.22
One program operating under this authority is the production of Ameri-
cans’ telephone records—the so-called “Verizon Metadata Program.” Imme-
diately after 9/11, President Bush arranged for the voluntary provisions of
communication records by major US telecommunications providers.23 Upon
a 2005 disclosure of the program in the press, one company asked the gov-
ernment to obtain a warrant from the FISA Court.24 Since 2006, the Court
has granted the warrants on a rolling basis, which include so-called “gag”
orders that prevent the companies from disclosing the requests to customers
or the public.25
With the details of the telephony metadata programs revealed after
nearly twelve years, scholars have argued that the program violates both the
Constitution and provisions of the Patriot Act.26 Proposals to reform this
legal regime have also been initiated in Congress. Thus far, these proposals
have failed.27 In June 2015, § 215 expires, setting the scene for a new round
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
22. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 105, Pub. L.
No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); see The
PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 § 2, Pub. L. No. 122-14, 125 Stat. 216 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
23. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-
phone-records-verizon-court-order. See OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE DEP’T OF
DEFENSE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY & OFFICE OF
THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM (2009), available at http://fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf.
24. Greenwald, supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. See L. K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Consid-
erations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 763 (2014); see R. LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BREN-
NAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES WITH AMERICANS’ DATA (2013).
27. Several bills are being proposed. The bill introduced by Congressman Sensenbren-
ner and Senator Leahy appeared among those most likely to be adopted, but narrowly failed by
a 58 to 42 vote, needing 60 votes in the Senate. Text of H.R. 3361: USA FREEDOM Act
(Referred to Senate Committee Version), GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/113/hr3361/text (last visited May 3, 2015).
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of legislative debates in the near future.28 Furthermore, court cases are pend-
ing in several circuits with vastly varying outcomes,29 suggesting that the
Supreme Court may eventually rule on the issue. It is too early to report on
the final outcomes of these legal and political debates. Regardless of the
outcomes, all three branches of government are involved in establishing the
legal protections under this first regulatory regime. As we will see, the other
two legal regimes discussed in this Article feature diminished legal protec-
tion and, consequently, prospects for reform.
B. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: International
Communications and Surveillance on US Soil
The second regulatory regime covers a class of surveillance operations
on international communications conducted on US soil, regulated by the
1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This Part describes this
second regime, the scope of surveillance operations covered under FISA, the
legal protections afforded to Americans under FISA, and the prospect of
FISA reform.
1. Overview
FISA and the FISA Court were introduced in 1978 in response to do-
mestic surveillance overreach and the Church Committee’s reform propos-
als.30 In 2008, Congress amended and broadened FISA with the FISA
Amendments Act (FAA).31 The FAA broadened the definition of “foreign
intelligence information” to include information “relating to the foreign af-
fairs of the United States.”32 With the new definition, surveillance of foreign
governments, corporations, media organizations, and citizens was explicitly
allowed.33 The FAA also introduced § 702, which enables warrantless sur-
veillance of foreign communications conducted on US soil, as long as the
operations do not “intentionally target US persons.”34 Ever since, authorities
have not required warrants for specific cases based on a particularized prob-
able cause; instead, the FISA Court issues generalized certifications for sur-
28. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 105, Pub. L.
No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); The
PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 § 2, Pub. L. No. 122-14, 125 Stat. 216 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
29. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 66 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
30. See supra notes 1 & 15 for references containing detailed analysis of the legal provi-
sions under FISA and its policy history.
31. See generally Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
32. 50 U.S.C. §1801(e)(2) (2012). See also supra note 1 at 10–12.
33. See 50 U.S.C. §1801(f), (i), (m) (2012).
34. See 50 U.S.C. §1881a(b)(1) (2012).
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veillance operations aimed at gathering foreign intelligence information.35 In
addition, the FISA Court has approved generalized “targeting” and “minimi-
zation” procedures to govern the processing of data after it has been col-
lected.36 These procedures are intended to ameliorate concerns about US
citizens’ privacy, and have remained classified until recently.
Since 2005, when reports of bulk wiretapping from the Internet back-
bone at an AT&T switch came to light, public awareness of bulk surveil-
lance operations on Americans has increased.37 Nonetheless, even after the
AT&T program was revealed, Congress passed the Protect America Act in
2007, which contained many of the provisions adopted in the FAA just one
year later.38 In late 2012, the FAA was extended for another five years.39
Two months later, the Supreme Court denied several US organizations legal
standing in their claim that the privacy of their international communications
was violated by § 702.40 In what appeared to be the final ruling on the con-
stitutionality of § 702, a 5-4 majority held that the civil society groups filing
suit lacked standing because they could not prove that their communications
had actually been intercepted.41 The details of the relevant programs re-
mained classified.42
35. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 105, Pub. L. No.
109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
36. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FOR TARGETING NON-UNITED STATES PESRONS REASONABLY BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES TO ACQUIRE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED
(2009), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/20/exhibit-a-pro-
cedures-nsa-document [hereinafter EXHIBIT A]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MINIMIZATION PROCE-
DURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLI-
GENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (2009), available at http://www.theguardian
.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/20/exhibit-b-nsa-procedures-document [hereinafter EXHIBIT
B].
37. Declaration of Mark Klein in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. C-06-0672-VRW),
available at https://www.eff.org/node/55051; See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush
Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.nytimes
.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
38. See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (repealed July
10, 2008). For a comparison between the provisions of the Protect America Act and FAA, see
Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet
Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 135–137 (2015).
39. FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-238.
40. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1138 (2013).
41. Id. at 1150.
42. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Supreme Court Dismisses
ACLU’s Challenge to NSA Warrantless Wiretapping Law (Feb. 26, 2013), available at https://
www.aclu.org/national-security/supreme-court-dismisses-aclus-challenge-nsa-warrantless-
wiretapping-law.
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The political debate and the issue of legal standing have shifted consid-
erably since the first Snowden leaks in June 2013. Today, it has become
clear that § 702 serves as the legal basis for surveillance operations like UP-
STREAM and PRISM.43 The NSA has also confirmed that § 702 is used to
compel US Internet companies to assist with warrantless surveillance.44 In
addition, several of the classified targeting and minimization procedures
under § 702 have been leaked or declassified,45 providing unique insights
into classified interpretations of the legal provisions in FISA as made by the
FISA Court and intelligence community.46 Ongoing lawsuits filed in 2008 to
challenge the constitutionality of the AT&T wiretapping operations under
the “Terrorist Surveillance Program” have also altered the political
landscape.47
Before describing § 702 in more detail, it is worth noting that FISA
§§ 703, 704 and 705b regulate surveillance to intentionally target US per-
sons.48 These provisions are outside the scope of this Article—our focus is
on surveillance operations conducted on foreign territory that do not inten-
tionally target US persons in the collection phase but affect Americans
nonetheless.49
2. Scope: The 1978 Definition of “Electronic Surveillance”
All communications surveillance operations that constitute “electronic
surveillance” as defined in FISA fall within its scope.50 The FISA definition
has remained largely intact since 197851 and fails to account for the technical
realities of today’s global communications networks.
To collect the content or metadata of “wire communication[s],” surveil-
lance only falls within the FISA definition when authorities “intentionally
target a US person,” or when the acquisition is conducted on US territory.52
If authorities conduct targeted surveillance from abroad, even if they know
43. See Donohue, supra note 38, at 195; Cf. Donohue, supra note 26.
44. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 6, at 4.
45. See, e.g., EXHIBIT A, supra note 36; EXHIBIT B, supra note 36.
46. For the most comprehensive analysis to date, see Donohue, supra note 38 at 195;
Donohue, supra note 26.
47. See, e.g., Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir. 2011). The Electronic Frontier
Foundation, one of the organizations involved in the court proceeding, maintains an updated
case document repository at https://www.eff.org/cases/jewel.
48. Depicted in Fig. 1: Flowchart Showing NSA Surveillance Operations, supra note
18.
49. Laura Donohue has observed that the warrant requirements in §§ 703 & 704 can be
circumvented by applying § 702 criteria to the collection phase and deciding after the fact if
data collected is of use for further processing. See Donohue, supra note 38, at 193.
50. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(f), 1812(a) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2012).
51. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2012).
52. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1),(2) (2012). The FISA definition only explicitly mentions
communications “content,” but also covers “metadata” (location, time, duration, identity of
communicants, etc.).
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that both “sender and all intended recipients are located in the United
States,” then only radio (i.e., wireless) communications fall within the FISA
definition of “electronic surveillance.”53
INTENTIONALLY TARGETING US PERSONS. “Intentionally targeting a US
person” constitutes “electronic surveillance” under FISA.54 However, neither
“intentionally” nor “targeting” are defined in FISA; instead, these concepts
are open to interpretation in classified “targeting” and “minimization” proce-
dures.55 The recent disclosure of these “targeting” and “minimization” pro-
cedures illuminates several areas of concern. For instance, bulk surveillance
is not regarded as “intentional targeting;” we discuss this further when we
look at legal protections afforded to US persons under FISA in the next sub-
Part.
Moreover, the “minimization” and “targeting” procedures reveal two
important new facts related to surveillance operations conducted abroad.
First, conducting surveillance abroad creates the presumption that the target
is a “non-US person.”56 Second, the “targeting procedures” do not provide
any due diligence requirement or duty of care to establish the identity of
parties on either side of a communication.57 This implies that unless a com-
municant is known to be a US person, the communicant is considered to be a
non-US person. Thus, authorities have a strong incentive to conduct surveil-
lance abroad: legal protections offered to US persons under FISA can be
circumvented, and a more permissive legal regime applies to data collection
under EO 12333.
INSTALLING A DEVICE. Preparing a communications infrastructure for
surveillance is of particular interest to this analysis.58 An example of such
infrastructure is the use of network protocol manipulations that modify the
flow of network traffic, as described in Part II. FISA contains a clause on
“the installation . . . of . . . surveillance device[s] in the United States,”
which can be understood as making a communications infrastructure ready
for surveillance.59 However, this clause only covers electronic surveillance
“other than wire or radio communication.” The US Congressional Research
Service gives “a hidden microphone” as an example of such “other
communication.”60
53. Id. § 1801(f)(3).
54. Id. § 1801(f)(1).
55. Cf. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17–18 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. Clapper,
959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
56. See EXHIBIT B, supra note 36.
57. Cf. EXHIBIT A, supra note 36.
58. For example, as described in Part II, surveillance personnel could use network pro-
tocol manipulations to modify the flow of network traffic.
59. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4) (2012).
60. EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42725, REAUTHORIZATION OF THE FISA
AMENDMENTS ACT 7 (2013).
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Under the current definition, most modern methods of preparing a
networked communications infrastructure for surveillance do not constitute
“electronic surveillance” under FISA and are, therefore, regulated only by
EO 12333. In 1978, when these FISA provisions were adopted, the “installa-
tion of a device” was perhaps necessary to divert traffic to a network loca-
tion where it could be collected.61 Today, no device installation is necessary:
one can exploit vulnerabilities in existing network devices (routers, web
proxies, etc.) and network protocols (BGP, DNS, etc.) to alter the flow of
network traffic and divert it towards a specified point of collection.62
It is possible that the intelligence community has secretly expanded the
scope of the 1978 “installing a device” definition to cover newer technolo-
gies. But even if this were true, “wired communications” fall outside this
part of the FISA definition altogether. Therefore, except when US persons
are intentionally targeted, operations for the purpose of “installing a device”
that eavesdrop on Internet communications do not constitute “electronic sur-
veillance” under the 1978 FISA definition. Moreover, under the current defi-
nition, it is irrelevant whether the “installation of a device” is conducted on
US soil or abroad, a relevant factor for our technical analysis in Part II.B.
Without full access to classified surveillance policies fully implement-
ing the directives of FISA and EO 12333, it is impossible to conclusively
determine how the intelligence community interprets US surveillance stat-
utes. But recent revelations on untargeted malware operations seem to sup-
port our textual analysis.63 These revelations indicate that NSA analysts
perform compliance checks against EO 12333 (but, importantly, not against
FISA) when singling out targets for more sophisticated malware operations
on the target’s machine.64 Based on these revelations, it seems likely that
advanced active attacks,65 which use modern technological capabilities to
prepare an infrastructure for a subsequent targeted surveillance operation,
are regulated under EO 12333.
3. Legal Protections for US Persons under FISA
Applicability of FISA to a surveillance operation is relevant for Ameri-
cans because the statute contains important legal protections for US persons
that are intentionally targeted. For instance, the statute states that the Fourth
61. Cf. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4) (2012).
62. See infra Part II.B on “How Deliberate Manipulations Can Divert US Traffic
Abroad.”
63. Jacob Applebaum et al., NSA Secret Toolbox: ANT Unit Offers Spy Gadgets for
Every Need, DER SPIEGEL, Dec. 30, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-se-
cret-toolbox-ant-unit-offers-spy-gadgets-for-every-need-a-941006.html; NSA Documents, DER
SPIEGEL (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/nsa-dokumente-so-knackt-der-
geheimdienst-internetkonten-fotostrecke-105326-13.html
64. Id.
65. E.g., advanced network protocol manipulations, described in Part I.C.3, and inject-
ing malware and installing backdoors in software or hardware.
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Amendment applies to surveillance operations under FISA and prohibits a
narrow set of four surveillance operations.66 Surveillance under § 702 may
not intentionally target a US person; § 703 of FISA regulates those opera-
tions instead. Another example is the “reverse-targeting” prohibition,67
which states that authorities may not target a non-US person under § 702
when the goal of the operation targets a US person. By contrast, as discussed
in Part I.C.3, infra, EO 12333 explicitly allows for intentional targeting of
US persons under certain conditions.
Vast opportunities for surveillance overreach exist within the bounds of
FISA.68 Other scholars have already offered a comprehensive analysis of the
FISA targeting and minimization procedures, along with a critical assess-
ment of the role of the FISA Court. For example, Laura Donohue argued that
these procedures allow for the creation of a “foreign intelligence” interest in
the data sometime after its collection.69 Despite the concerning aspects of
FISA, at least all three branches of government are involved in FISA, either
directly (by amending the statute or the executive measures enacting it) or
through the opportunity for judicial review.
4. FISA Reform: Three Branches of Government
FISA and FAA have serious implications for Americans’ privacy rights.
In response to the recent disclosures, proposals such as the USA Freedom
Act seek to reform current legal and regulatory schemes, for instance, by
introducing a “civil liberties advocate” that defends privacy interests to
make FISA Court hearings adversarial.70 These proposals, which thus far
have failed, pay little attention to the loopholes described in this Article. In
the long run, all three branches of government must be involved in regulat-
ing such surveillance. FISA and FAA are statutes approved by Congress; the
executive branch regulates the operational details of surveillance; and target-
ing and minimization procedures are approved by the FISA Court.71
66. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b) (2012).
67. Id. § 1881(b)(2).
68. See, e.g., EXHIBIT B, supra note 36. One of the most-discussed loopholes is when
US persons are not “intentionally targeted” but still affected by a surveillance operation. A
well-known example is the bulk interception on the Internet backbone on US soil of interna-
tional communications under the UPSTREAM program. Instead of promptly destroying such
data, generous exemptions exist to use the “incidentally” or “inadvertently” collected informa-
tion of the affected Internet users, American and non-American alike. See also Barton Gell-
man, Julie Tate, & Ashkan Soltani, In NSA-intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted Far




69. See Donohue, supra note 38, at 170–74.
70. See supra note 27 at § 401.
71. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(i)(1)(A) (2012).
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C. Executive Order 12333: Surveillance Conducted on Foreign Soil
The legal protections afforded to Americans, and the prospects for re-
form, are significantly lowered under EO 12333. Electronic surveillance
conducted abroad is largely regulated by Executive Order (EO) 12333. Sur-
veillance policies regulated under this regime are designed and adopted
solely within the executive branch. The NSA recently acknowledged that EO
12333 is “the foundational authority by which NSA collects, retains, ana-
lyzes, and disseminates foreign signals intelligence information.”72
Until recently, the public’s ability to analyze the full extent of US sur-
veillance policies has been limited. Many relevant policies were completely
classified.73 Secrecy might explain why EO 12333 and its underlying poli-
cies have seen little discussion in policy and scholarly circles; understanding
was simply obstructed by classification.
Over the last year, leaks and government releases have enabled a deeper
understanding of EO 12333 surveillance policies. But many relevant
sentences, paragraphs, sections and even entire documents containing sur-
veillance policy (not actual operations) remain classified. The issue of classi-
fied law and policy remains a critical subject for policymakers to address.74
This sub-Part analyzes what is publicly known about EO 12333 and
flags remaining knowledge gaps relevant to our analysis, focusing on the US
Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID 18). After providing an over-
view of EO 12333, we discuss the scope of the document and its application
to advanced network surveillance methods. We then describe how US intel-
ligence authorities enjoy broad and largely unchecked legal authority when
conducting surveillance abroad and how legal protections offered to Ameri-
cans under EO 12333 are weaker than under the other two regimes discussed
in this Article. Part I.C.4 explores the NSA’s official response to an earlier
version of this Article—one that fails to address the main issues raised here.
Finally, we point to fundamental structural issues in the US Constitution that
could serve as barriers to the long-term reform of EO 12333 policies. Here,
we briefly examine a new legal authority created by Congress in December
2014: § 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Bill 2014–15,75 introduced and
voted on within forty-eight hours.76 The exact implications of this provision
remain opaque, apparently even to the majority of lawmakers in Congress,
and are subject to speculation by lawmakers, the media, and the public.77
72. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 6, at 2.
73. See infra Part I.C.1.
74. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 12, at 9–10, 47–70.
75. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. 113-293, 128 Stat.
3990.
76. See Facebook Page of Rep. Justin Amash, FACEBOOK (Dec. 10, 2014, 9:10 PM),
https://www.facebook.com/repjustinamash/posts/812569822115759.
77. Id.
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The President signed the bill into law shortly after it was congressionally
approved.
This Article is not an exhaustive analysis of EO 12333’s loopholes; it
focuses, instead, on bulk surveillance on Americans by collecting network
traffic abroad. Other types of surveillance operations are also authorized
under EO 12333, including malware deployment.78 With regard to actual
bulk surveillance operations, the public has learned how the NSA assumed
authority under EO 12333 to acquire communications (including those of
US persons) within Google and Yahoo! networks because the operation was
conducted on foreign territory under the MUSCULAR program;79 we dis-
cuss MUSCULAR in Part II.A.
1. Overview
EO 12333 is a broad document, readily available to the public.80 The
complex web of instructions and directives implementing EO 12333 contain
even more detailed rules for intelligence conduct.
Two Department of Defense (DoD) Directives fall immediately beneath
EO 12333 in the legal hierarchy and contain more detailed principles on
“DoD activities that may affect US persons.”81 EO 12333 and these DoD
Directives form the basis of US Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID
18).82 USSID 18 was drafted by intelligence community executives in the
Defense Department and approved by the Attorney General in the Justice
Department.83 USSID 18 contains fairly specific surveillance principles.84
But many sentences and some complete paragraphs in USSID 18 remain
classified. Prior to the MUSCULAR revelations on October 30, 2013, only a
redacted 1993 version of USSID 18 had been released. On November 18,
2013, a 2011 version of USSID 18 was released.85 We focus our analysis on
this recently declassified, but heavily redacted, 2011 version of the
document.
USSID 18 § 2 references several legal documents that further specify
intelligence activities governed by the aforementioned DoD Directives, as
well as a document establishing oversight procedures titled “NSA/CSS Pol-
78. See NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 6, at 2–3; Applebaum et al., supra
note 63; NSA Documents, supra note 63.
79. See PRIVACY &  CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 12.
80. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. (1981).
81. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. Directive 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities (Aug. 2007);
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. Directive 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelli-
gence Components That Affect United States Persons (Dec. 1982).
82. See USSID 18, supra note 5, § 2.1.
83. Id. (while the procedures of approval are still unclear due to the classified docu-
ments, USSID 18 was approved by Attorney General Janet Reno in 1997).
84. See id. §§ 4–9.
85. See USSID 18, supra note 5, at 1 (approved for release by the NSA on Nov. 13,
2013).
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icy No. 1-23, procedures governing NSA/CSS Activities that affect US per-
sons.”86 Interestingly, the latter document references a classified Annex A of
EO 12333.87 Some commentators have pointed toward the existence of this
Annex, which sits right at the top of the legal hierarchy.88 It appears that the
same Annex is mentioned in a redacted public version of NSA/CSS Policy
No. 1-23.89 Although we are not in a position to further reflect on the classi-
fied content of this Annex, its existence serves as a reminder that additional
loopholes may exist beyond those identified in this Part.
2. Scope of FISA: Surveillance Abroad is
Not “Electronic Surveillance”
Internet surveillance falls within the EO 12333 regime when it is con-
ducted on foreign soil and does not fall within the 1978 FISA definition of
“electronic surveillance.”90 As the NSA recently put it, EO 12333 applies
when surveillance is “conducted through various means around the globe,
largely from outside the United States, which is not otherwise regulated by
FISA.”91
While FISA surveillance is conducted on US soil, EO 12333 surveil-
lance is mostly conducted abroad.92 EO 12333 presumes that network traffic,
intercepted on foreign soil, belongs to non-US persons.93 Companies and
associations are also considered in the EO 12333 definition of “US per-
sons.”94 These entities may be assumed to be non-US persons if they have
their headquarters outside the United States. Even when it is known to the
NSA that a company is legally controlled by a US company, EO 12333 does
not prohibit the NSA to assume such an entity to be a non-US person under
USSID 18. Taken together, the hurdles for presuming that surveillance does
not affect a US person under EO 12333 are low. By contrast, FISA minimi-
86. Id. § 2.1.
87. See NSA / CENT. SEC. SERV., NSA/CSS POLICY NO. 1-23 - PROCEDURES GOV-
ERNING NSA/CSS ACTIVITIES THAT AFFECT U.S. PERSONS § 8(f) (Mar. 2004), available at
http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf.
88. See Marcy Wheeler, Snowden: ”A Classified Executive Order”, EMPTYWHEEL (May
30, 2014), https://www.emptywheel.net/2014/05/30/snowden-a-classified-executive-order.
89. See NSA, supra note 87, annex.
90. See supra Part I.B.2.
91. See NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 6, at 2. The statement seems to sug-
gest that all surveillance operations, even domestic ones, that do not fall with the 1978 FISA
definition are regulated by EO 12333. In this Article, we focus on advanced network surveil-
lance operations conducted from abroad, but how to exactly draw the line between FISA and
EO 12333 applicability, and how EO 12333 might regulate domestic operations, is an impor-
tant subject for public debate and further research.
92. See supra Part I.B.2.
93. USSID 18, supra note 5, § 9.8 (defining “foreign communications”).
94. Id. at § 9.18.e.2 (defining “U.S. person”).
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zation policies direct authorities to presume that surveillance operations con-
ducted on US soil affect US persons.95
INSTALLING A DEVICE. To understand how EO 12333 regulates the net-
work protocol manipulations described in Part II.B, we now return to the
question of “installing a device.”96 These manipulations fall under EO
12333. However, on top of the 1978 FISA definition of “electronic surveil-
lance,” neither EO 12333 nor the 2011 update of USSID 18 further specify
what “installing a device” means today.97 It is not covered in the definitions
of “collection,”98 “interception,”99 or “electronic surveillance.”100 The defini-
tion of “installing a device” to enable surveillance could possibly be re-
dacted in USSID 18 or further specified in a still-classified guideline. A
post-Snowden NSA memorandum does not provide any clarity. To the
contrary:
N.S.A. uses EO 12333 authority to collect foreign intelligence from
communications systems around the world. Due to the fragility of
these sources, providing any significant detail outside of classified
channels is damaging to national security.101
One recently leaked document seems to suggest that EO 12333 governs
untargeted malware attacks and strategies. The revealed slide on the
VALIDATOR program indicates that the VALIDATOR malware is
deployed in an untargeted fashion on many machines. Once the
VALIDATOR malware infects a given machine, the infected machine con-
tacts a “listening post” server. Finally, analysts at the listening point perform
a “USSID-18 check” to “validate the targets identity and location” and thus
decide whether “a more sophisticated . . . implant” may be deployed on the
infected machine.102 Importantly, the USSID 18 check is only performed
after the untargeted VALIDATOR malware has been deployed.103 In other
words, legal protection comes into play only after the NSA knows who it is
targeting, based on the identity of a target or the location of his/her machine.
This is consistent with our contention that the 1978 FISA definition of “in-
stalling a device” does not cover the advanced network manipulations
presented in Part II.B.104
95. See supra Part I.B.3.
96. See also supra Part I.B.2.
97. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. (1981).
98. USSID 18, supra note 5, § 9.2.
99. Id. § 9.11.
100. Id. § 9.7.
101. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 6, at 2–3.
102. Applebaum et al., supra note 63.
103. Id.
104. See supra Part I.B.2.
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3. Legal Protections for Americans Under EO 12333
EO 12333 states that electronic surveillance should consider the rights
of US persons.105 The details of this consideration are further specified in the
underlying documentation, particularly USSID 18.106 In the Washington
Post, a former NSA chief analyst claimed that surveillance regulated by EO
12333 affords fewer legal protections to Americans than operations author-
ized under FISA:
N.S.A. has platoons of lawyers, and their entire job is figuring out
how to stay within the law and maximize collection by exploiting
every loophole . . . . It’s fair to say the rules are less restrictive
under Executive Order 12333 than they are under FISA.107
Despite the redactions in USSID 18, the 2011 version makes several
new contributions to our collective understanding of how legal protections
for US persons are less restrictive under EO 12333.
INTENTIONALLY TARGETING US PERSONS. This Article concentrates on
not “intentionally targeting US Persons.”108 But EO 12333 establishes that
electronic surveillance operations—ones that fall under its regime and do
not fall under the FISA regime—may intentionally intercept US persons’
communications as long as they meet the requirements summed up in US-
SID 18. USSID 18 § 4 is titled “Collection” and contains an entire section
that is completely redacted.109 Moreover, § 4.1 spans four full pages of ex-
ceptions for situations in which US persons may be intentionally targeted.110
Furthermore, a central passage of the opening paragraph of §4.1 is redacted.
It reads:
4.1. Communications which are known to be to, from or about a
U.S. PERSON [one complete line redacted] not be intentionally in-
tercepted, or selected through the use of A SELECTION TERM,
except in the following instances . . .111
In addition, the entire subsection on “international communications” is
redacted.112 These subsections would be some of many candidates for trans-
parency that could be obtained via political oversight or FOIA requests.113
105. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. (1981).
106. See USSID 18, supra note 5.
107. Gellman & Soltani, supra note 13.
108. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2012).
109. USSID 18, supra note 5, § 4.2.
110. See USSID 18, supra note 5, § 4.1.
111. Id.
112. Id. § 4.1(b)(1)(b).
113. FOIA requests have been made, but unfortunately, as of February 2015, we have not
seen anything useful about the redactions in USSID 18 that we mention here. See generally
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Executive Order 12,333 - FOIA Lawsuit, ACLU (Feb. 3,
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There are other specific exceptions where “communications which are
known to be to, from, or about US persons” may be “intentionally inter-
cepted.”114 Even with the many redactions, it is possible to see that the ex-
ceptions provide more diminished protections on critical points than the
already permissive “minimization procedures” under FISA.
Often, instead of FISA Court approval, some operations merely require
the Attorney General or the NSA Director’s approval.115 Out of dozens of
scenarios mentioned, one especially interesting instance is the consent ex-
ception.116 It states that when US persons (including US corporations) con-
sent to a surveillance operation, the approval of the Director of the NSA
suffices to go ahead with a program as long as the surveillance does not fall
within the FISA regime. Indeed, May 2014 saw revelations on NSA’s “stra-
tegic partnerships” with several leading corporations, which may point to a
“consent”-based relationship.117
To clarify the impact of the consent exception, consider the following
hypothetical example of how it could be interpreted and applied: the NSA
might ask for and obtain consent from AT&T—a “US person” because the
AT&T headquarters are located in Texas—to tap and collect all traffic flow-
ing through an AT&T switch located abroad. Traffic (both “content” and
“metadata”) at this switch could then be collected, regardless of whether it
contains communication records of Americans or foreigners. Perhaps the un-
derlying rationale for operation MUSCULAR118 was a situation in which
Google and Yahoo! did not provide such consent, spurring the intelligence
community to seek other ways to access to the data. However, several
sentences in USSID 18 remain redacted,119 thus prohibiting us from estab-
lishing scenarios with complete certainty and leaving our hypotheticals a
thought exercise. To enable further understanding of the scope of surveil-
lance abroad on Americans, authorized by unilateral approval by the Direc-
tor of the NSA combined with the “consent” of US corporations, it would be
useful to target political pressure or FOIA requests at USSID 18 § 4.
WIDE EXEMPTIONS TO PROCESS US PERSON DATA ALREADY COLLECTED.
Under USSID 18, further processing of communications of foreigners after
2015), https://www.aclu.org/national-security-technology-and-liberty/executive-order-12333-
foia-lawsuit.
114. USSID 18, supra note 5 §§ 4.1(a)–(d).
115. Id. § 4.1(b) (requiring Attorney General’s approval); Id. § 4.1(c) (requiring the Di-
rector of NSA’s approval).
116. See id. § 4.1(c)(1).
117. See GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND
THE US SURVEILLANCE STATE (Metropolitan Books, 2014), available at https://usnew-
sghost.wordpress.com/2014/05/14/latest-nsa-edward-snowden-documents-slides-leaks-no-
place-to-hide-documents-pdf-glenn-greenwald.
118. See supra Part II.A.1.
119. USSID 18, supra note 5, § 4.1.
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collection is unrestrained.120 In addition, there are several generous exemp-
tions that allow for further processing of communication between US per-
sons intercepted during the collection of foreign communications, including
when communications are encrypted; when they are significant for foreign
intelligence purposes; when they are useful as evidence in criminal proceed-
ings and when they are helpful to reveal communications security vulnera-
bilities.121 Under USSID 18, the NSA Director decides whether these
scenarios apply, and whether communications between US persons can be
retained pursuant to procedures approved by the Attorney General.122 Under
FISA, the Attorney General makes such determinations subsequent to proce-
dures approved by the FISA Court.123
4. The Official NSA Response to Our Analysis
As noted in the Introduction to this Article, coverage of an earlier online
version of this Article by CBS News spurred an official response from the
NSA compliance department.124 The relevant part of the media report reads
as follows:125
However, an N.S.A. spokesperson denied that either EO 12333 or
USSID 18 authorizes targeting of U.S. persons for electronic sur-
veillance by routing their communications outside of the U.S., in an
emailed statement to CBS News.
‘Absent limited exception (for example, in an emergency), the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act requires that we get a court order
to target any U.S. person anywhere in the world for electronic sur-
veillance. In order to get such an order, we have to establish, to the
satisfaction of a federal judge, probable cause to believe that the
U.S. person is an agent of a foreign power,’ the spokesperson said.
Our response to the NSA statement was published online on July 11,
2014, and the NSA has not yet responded.126 The NSA statement to CBS
News cleverly sidetracks our analysis by re-framing the issue to construct a
legal situation that evades our main arguments. Specifically, the statement
concentrates on the legality of “targeting US persons,” an issue we barely
120. See id. § 5.3.
121. Id. § 5.4(d).
122. Id. § 4.1(c).
123. See supra note 28.
124. Zack Whittaker, Legal Loopholes Could Allow Wider NSA Surveillance, Research-
ers Say, CBS NEWS (June 30, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/legal-loopholes-could-let-
nsa-surveillance-circumvent-fourth-amendment-researchers-say.
125. Id.
126. Axel Arnbak & Sharon Goldberg, Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitution,
the NSA Statement, and Our Response, FREEDOM TO TINKER, July 11, 2014, available at
https://freedom-_to-_tinker.com/blog/axel/our-_response-_to-_the-_nsa-_reaction-_to-_our-
_new-_internet-_traffic-_shaping-_paper.
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analyze. Indeed, the loopholes we identify in this Article exist when 1) sur-
veillance is conducted abroad and 2) operations do not intentionally target a
US person. The NSA statement, therefore, does not address our concerns.
Moreover, in re-wiring the legal situation to cover the targeting of US
persons, the element “absent limited exceptions (for example, an emer-
gency)”127 of the NSA statement is also misleading. Exceptions for targeting
US persons under EO 12333 are outlined in USSID 18 § 4.128 These excep-
tions span four redacted pages and include a completely classified para-
graph.129 It is impossible to tell what lies beneath those redactions, and we
do not intend to speculate on their contents. Even so, it seems unlikely that
one could reasonably characterize four pages of exceptions and an entirely
classified paragraph—which could amount to dozens of actual scenarios—as
“limited.”
5. EO 12333 Reform: The Sole Province of the Executive Branch
Aside from the differences discussed thus far, EO 12333 has a more
fundamental difference from FISA: over the next years, all three branches of
government could be involved with Patriot Act and FISA reform. For EO
12333, this is hardly the case. International surveillance regulated under EO
12333 is overseen first and foremost by the executive branch.130 This simple
observation has a long tradition in US Constitutional law that gives broad
Article II authority to the President when it comes to protecting national
security against overseas threats.131 As Part II will highlight, however, to-
day’s technologies challenge the long-standing core concept in US surveil-
lance law that operations conducted abroad will not affect Americans in
large numbers. This tension between local law and global technology sur-
faces in a particularly striking manner with EO 12333, which regulates sur-
veillance operations conducted abroad.
This broad Article II constitutional authority can result in a lack of over-
sight, or checks and balances, between separate branches of government.
Even if the Attorney General-approved procedures must be submitted to the
US Senate Intelligence Committee, tasked to oversee US intelligence agen-
cies, legal and practical constraints to oversight remain.132 These constraints
127. See Whittaker, supra note 124.
128. See supra Part I.B.3.
129. Id.
130. Kenneth R. Mayer, Executive Orders and Presidential Power, 61 J. POL. 445, 452
(1999) (stating that “executive orders are a unilateral presidential tool”).
131. See John C. Duncan, A Critical Examination of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of
Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 346 (2010).
132. See Tye, supra note 11; PRIVACY &  CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note
12; See also Mark Danner, He Remade Our World, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Apr.
3, 2014), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/apr/03/dick-cheney-he-
remade-our-world/; Ryan Lizza, State of Deception, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 13, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/16/state-of-deception.
Spring 2015] Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitution 341
range from the executive branch constructing permanent emergency national
security scenarios that obstruct oversight, to Congress being practically
barred from oversight via classification to practical constraints that include
being forbidden to take notes or bring assistants to briefings. The Committee
Chair, Senator Dianne Feinstein, said that EO 12333 “programs are under
the executive branch entirely,” and have “few, if any, privacy
protections.”133
The relative lack of authority for EO 12333 policies in the broader pol-
icy arena, beyond the executive branch, might explain why there are still so
many redactions in place in USSID 18. In any event, considering the legal
loopholes in EO 12333 and the technical means by which they can be ex-
ploited,134 EO 12333 reform is urgent to protect Americans’ privacy. Al-
though the PCLOB announced in July 2014 that it will investigate EO 12333
policies,135 the PCLOB reports directly to the President; technically, the in-
vestigation cannot be said to be fully independent because the executive
branch controls the prospects of EO 12333 reform as investigated by the
PCLOB.
Finally, during its annual intelligence community budget negotiations in
December, 2014, Congress introduced and approved a new legal provision,
all within forty-eight hours. This provision could have deep implications for
protections afforded to US persons during surveillance operations conducted
abroad. Intelligence Authorization Bill 2014–15 § 309136 mandates that the
Attorney General set a five year retention limit on data collected abroad that
involves US persons, thereby codifying similar provisions similar to USSID
18.137 This provision was introduced shortly before the deadline of the
budget negotiations, hardly debated, and approved within forty-eight hours
133. Ali Watkins, Most Of NSA’s Data Collection Authorized By Order Ronald Reagan
Issued, MCCLATCHYDC (Nov. 31, 2013), available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/
21/209167/most-of-nsas-data-collection-authorized.html; See also PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES
OVERSIGHT BD.,supra note 12.
134. See infra Part II.
135. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., PCLOB Posts Status of Attorney
General-Approved U.S. Person Procedures Under Executive Order 12333, PCLOB.GOV (Feb.
19, 2015), https://www.pclob.gov/newsroom/20150219.html (stating that the PCLOB
“. . . plans to prepare one or more public reports on E.O. 12333 activities.”).
136. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. 113-293, 128 Stat.
3990.
137. See supra Part II.C.3; U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMM.
ON INTELLEGENCE, FACT SHEET ON H.R. 4681, THE FISCAL YEAR 2015 INTELLIGENCE AU-
THORIZATION ACT (Dec. 12, 2014), http://intelligence.house.gov/press-release/fact-sheet-hr-
4681-fiscal-year-2015-intelligence-authorization-act (the official record mentioning that “al-
though the executive branch already follows procedures along these lines, Section 309 would
enshrine the requirement in law”).
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by both the Senate and the House.138 The bill was then sent to the President,
who signed the bill into law shortly thereafter.
The wording of § 309 leaves many open questions of interpretation. It
has become the subject of considerable controversy and debate amongst
lawmakers, the media, and the public. For instance, it is unclear how § 309
relates to FISA §§ 703 and 704, which afford more robust protections to US
persons when data is collected abroad.139 One plausible explanation could be
that the new provision legitimizes an already existing surveillance operation
that collects huge amounts of US person data on foreign soil, without ap-
proval of the FISA Court.140 This would be an intelligent move from a com-
pliance perspective. By approving § 309, Congress might have created a
statutory basis for further uses of data collected abroad, formerly based on
USSID 18 minimization procedures merely approved by the Attorney Gen-
eral. With § 309, diminished legal protections to Americans under USSID
18 minimization procedures could have a chance to become statute, making
the legitimacy of programs based on EO 12333 and USSID 18, like MUS-
CULAR,141 no longer an issue if a court would find these now disclosed
programs should have been based on FISA and reviewed by the FISA Court.
The lack of comprehensive legislative debate on § 309 renders it impos-
sible to come to robust conclusions on its implications. At this point, this is
merely an issue for further research. But one can criticize the approval both
in the House and the Senate of such critical surveillance policy introduced
48 hours before a budgetary deadline, without proper legislative debate to
establish the actual meaning of a provision or to express the intent of the
legislature.
§ 309 could go down as a historic moment in surveillance policy. It
could entail a significant depression of legal protections afforded to US per-
sons when data is collected abroad. It is also apparently the first time that
Congress involved itself directly with data collection and retention usually
regulated under EO 12333. Paradoxically, the effect of § 309 might be a
legal precedent for more transparently deliberated, better informed and per-
haps privacy protective approaches going forward.
D. Summary
Surveillance programs under EO 12333 might collect startling amounts
of sensitive data on both foreigners and Americans. Agents acting under the
138. See Facebook Page of Rep. Justin Amash, FACEBOOK (Dec. 10, 2014, 9:10 PM),
https://www.facebook.com/repjustinamash/posts/812569822115759.
139. See supra Part I.B.
140. See Marcy Wheeler, Section 309: A Band-Aid for a Gaping Wound in Democracy,
EMPTYWHEEL (Dec. 14, 2014), https://www.emptywheel.net/2014/12/14/section-309-a-band-
aid-for-a-gaping-wound-in-democracy (discussing public statements made by Bob Litt, Gen-
eral Counsel in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence).
141. See infra Part II.A.1 (providing a more detailed discussion of this program).
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authority of EO 12333 and USSID 18 may presume communications are
non-American, precisely because their operations are conducted abroad.
Such operations are regulated by guidelines adopted almost entirely within
the executive branch, without any meaningful congressional or judicial in-
volvement. Generous exemptions, more permissive than under FISA, enable
use of information “incidentally” collected on US persons, and critical de-
tails remain classified. These concerns remain primarily within the purview
of the executive branch. So far, the executive branch has not yet sufficiently
addressed these concerns. The lack of checks and balances between three
branches of government in this respect is likely exacerbating the situation.
Oversight between branches of government and constitutional safe-
guards can be circumvented by designing surveillance operations in ways
that lead to application of the EO 12333 regime, instead of FISA. Conse-
quently, regardless of the outcome of Patriot Act and FISA reform, EO
12333 will continue to provide opportunities for largely unrestrained surveil-
lance on Americans from abroad.
II. LOOPHOLES THAT EXPLOIT NETWORK PROTOCOLS
The collection of a US person’s network traffic from abroad presents a
loophole that can be exploited to circumvent both legal safeguards protect-
ing Americans’ privacy and oversight mechanisms established by other
branches of government. The current regulatory framework, therefore, cre-
ates incentives for intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance operations
on foreign soil, regardless of whether these operations actually affect Ameri-
can communications.
This Part discusses how the Internet’s core protocols can cause traffic
sent by Americans to be routed abroad, where data can be collected under
the most permissive third legal regime for network surveillance. We distin-
guish two settings: 1) situations where the vagaries of Internet protocols
cause Americans’ traffic to naturally be routed abroad, and 2) situations
where Internet protocols are deliberately manipulated to cause Americans’
traffic to be routed abroad.
A. US Traffic Can Naturally Be Routed Abroad
The Internet was not designed around geopolitical borders; instead, its
design reflects a focus on providing robust and reliable communications
while minimizing cost. In this section, we discuss why it is not uncommon
for network traffic between two endpoints located on US soil to be routed
outside the United States, both in the intradomain (within a single organiza-
tion’s network) and the interdomain (between different networks run by dif-
ferent organizations) settings. Traffic between two US endpoints that is
naturally routed abroad can then be collected abroad under the permissive
EO 12333 regime.
344 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 21:317
1. Interception in the Intradomain
A network owned by a single organization can be physically located in
multiple jurisdictions, even if a company or organization is nominally head-
quartered in the US, like Yahoo! or Google. The revealed MUSCULAR pro-
gram illustrates how the NSA presumed authority under EO 12333 to
acquire traffic between company servers by tapping fiber-optic cables on
foreign territory (in the United Kingdom), collecting up to 180 million user
records per month, regardless of nationality.142 Companies like Yahoo! and
Google replicate data across multiple servers that periodically send data to
each other, for backup and synchronization.143 These servers are located in
different countries to prevent valuable data from being lost in case of out-
ages or errors in one location.144 The MUSCULAR program collects the traf-
fic sent between these data centers: although this traffic traverses multiple
national jurisdictions, it remains within the logical network boundaries of the
internal corporate networks of Yahoo! and Google. This is one example
where loopholes under the legal regime of EO 12333 were utilized in the
intradomain, i.e., within the logical boundaries of a network owned by a
single organization.
2. Interception in the Interdomain
Another method for utilizing the EO 12333 legal regime is the in-
terdomain setting, where digital traffic traverses networks belonging to dif-
ferent organizations. Specifically, interdomain routing with the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) can naturally cause traffic originating in a US net-
142. See Tye, supra note 11 (the fact that collection is done on British territory was noted
here: “We do not know exactly how the NSA and GCHQ intercept the data, other than it
happens on British territory.”); Barton Gellman, Ashkan Soltani, and Andrea Peterson, How
We Know The NSA Had Access To Internal Google And Yahoo Cloud Data, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Nov. 4, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/
11/04/how-we-know-the-nsa-had-access-to-internal-google-and-yahoo-cloud-data.
143. GOOGLE, Data and Security, http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/data-
security/index.html (“Rather than storing each user’s data on a single machine or set of ma-
chines, we distribute all data—including our own—across many computers in different loca-
tions. We then chunk and replicate the data over multiple systems to avoid a single point of
failure.”) (last visited May 3, 2015); GOOGLE, Data Center Locations, http://www.google.com/
about/datacenters/inside/locations/index.html (google datacenter location are distributed
worldwide); YINGYING CHEN ET AL., A FIRST LOOK AT INTER-DATA CENTER TRAFFIC CHARAC-
TERISTICS VIA YAHOO! DATASETS, presented at IEEE INFOCOM 2011, available at http://
www-users.cs.umn.edu/~yingying/papers/infocom11-yingying-paper.pdf (Yahoo datacenter
locations).
144. GOOGLE, Data and Security, http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/data-
security/index.html (“Rather than storing each user’s data on a single machine or set of ma-
chines, we distribute all data—including our own—across many computers in different loca-
tions. We then chunk and replicate the data over multiple systems to avoid a single point of
failure.”) (last visited May 3, 2015).
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work to be routed abroad, even when it is destined for a network that is
located on US soil.
BGP is the routing protocol that enables communication between Au-
tonomous Systems (ASes),145 which are networks owned by different organi-
zations.146 ASes are interconnected,147 creating a graph where nodes are
ASes and edges are the links between them.148 ASes use BGP to learn paths
through the AS-level graph: an AS discovers a path to a destination AS via
BGP messages received from each of its neighboring ASes.149 An AS then
uses its local routing policies to choose a single most-preferred path to the
destination AS from the set of paths it learned from its neighbors. The AS
then forwards all traffic for the destination AS to the neighboring AS that
announced the most-preferred path.150
Importantly, the local policies used to determine route selection in BGP
are typically agnostic to geopolitical considerations; path selection is often
based on the price of forwarding traffic to the neighboring AS that an-
nounced the path, as well as on the number of ASes on the path announced
by that neighbor.151 This means that it can sometimes be cheaper to forward
traffic through a neighboring AS that is physically located in a different
country. This situation is common, for example, in South America, where
network paths between two South American endpoint ASes often cross un-
dersea cables to Miami,152 and Canada, where network paths between two
Canadian endpoint ASes regularly traverse American ASes.153
3. The NSA’s Ability to Intercept Traffic on Foreign Soil
Recent revelations indicate that the NSA has the capability to collect
Internet traffic on foreign soil by tapping into transnational fiber-optic
cables. A single transnational fiber-optic cable can aggregate huge volumes
of both interdomain and intradomain telecommunications (including In-
ternet, telephony, facsimile, and VoIP traffic) generated by hundreds of dif-
145. Yakov Rekhter & Tony Li, RFC1771: A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), THE
INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, p. 1, (Mar. 1995), available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1771.
146. E.g., Google’s network, China Telecom’s network, or Boston University’s network.
147. Rekhter, supra note 145.
148. See infra Fig. 2 at Part II.B.1 for a graphical representation that discusses a deliber-
ate BGP manipulation to route Internet traffic abroad.
149. Rekhter, supra note 145.
150. Id.
151. Matthew Caesar & Jennifer Rexford, BGP Routing Policies in ISP Networks, IEEE
NETWORKS MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2005 at 5, 6, available at http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~caesar/
papers/policies.pdf.
152. Doug Madory, ‘Crecimiento’ in Latin America, DYN RESEARCH (May 23, 2013),
http://www.renesys.com/2013/05/crecimiento-in-latin-america.
153. See IXMAPS, http://ixmaps.ca (last visited May 3, 2015) (ongoing work by Sharon
Goldberg seeks to measure how often this occurs when both endpoints are located in the US).
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ferent ASes.154 This sub-Part briefly describes cable-tapping activities
apparently connected by a division of the NSA known as Special Sources
Operation (SSO).155
One program, codenamed WINDSTOP, deals with collection from so-
called “second party” countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Ca-
nada, New Zealand, Australia). The MUSCULAR program (discussed in
Part II.A.1) falls under the umbrella of WINDSTOP, as does the IN-
CENSER program, which likely collects billions of records each month.156
INCENSER involves tapping into the network linking one trans-Atlantic fi-
ber-optic cable from the United States to the United Kingdom (the “FLAG
Atlantic 1” cable) to another transnational cable from the United Kingdom to
Japan via the Mediterranean, India, and China (the “FLAG Europe Asia”
cable).157 The cable was tapped on British soil by the British Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and the collected traffic was shared
with the NSA.158
Moreover, the NSA’s RAMPART-A operation is a cable-tapping pro-
gram undertaken in collaboration with a foreign “third-party” country, i.e., a
country other than one of the “five eye” countries.159 The foreign country
taps into international fiber-optic cables located on its own territory, moves
154. See, e.g., FLAG TELECOM, http://sdc.flagtelecom.com/network/flag_atlantic_1.html
(last visited May 3, 2015) (The FLAG Atlantic 1 cable from the U.K. to the U.S. for instance
has a potential capacity of 4.8 terabit per second.).
155. The SSO division “had an official seal that might have been parody: an eagle with
all the world’s cables in its grasp.” Barton Gellman, Edward Snowden, After Months Of NSA




156. In the same thirty-day period, the numbers of records collected by the INCENSER
program were over two orders of magnitude higher than those collected by MUSCULAR. See
Gellman, supra note 13.
157. Submarine Cable Map, TELEGEOGRAPHY SUBMARINE CABLE MAP, http://www.sub-
marinecablemap.com (last visited May 3, 2015); Neal Stephenson, Mother Earth Mother
Board, WIRED (Dec. 1996), available at http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/4.12/ffglass
.html?topic=&topic_set=.
158. Details of the INCENSER program were revealed by Geoff White, Spy Cable Re-
vealed: How Telecoms Firm Worked With GCHQ, CHANNEL 4 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq;
Frederik Obermaier et al., Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided
GCHQ’s Spying Efforts, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG INTERNATIONAL (Nov. 25, 2014), available at
http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsid-
iary-cable.
159. For a description of the “five eye” countries, see supra note 18. Anton Geist et al.,
NSA ‘Third Party’ Partners Tap The Internet Backbone In Global Surveillance Program, IN-
FORMATION (June 19, 2014), available at http://www.information.dk/501280; Ryan Gallagher,
How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet, THE INTECEPT (June 19, 2014),
available at https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-part-
ners-revealed-rampart-a.
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the raw traffic to a processing center on its territory that contains NSA-
provided equipment, and forwards the traffic to a NSA site on US soil.160
The three largest RAMPART sites—codenamed AZUREPHOENIX, SPIN-
NERET, and MOONLIGHTPATH—tap a total of seventy different interna-
tional cables; although the locations of various sites remain unknown, media
reports suggest that both Germany and Denmark are involved.161
B. How Deliberate Manipulations Can Divert US Traffic Abroad
In addition to situations where Americans’ traffic is naturally routed
abroad, the Internet’s core protocols—BGP and DNS—can be deliberately
manipulated to force traffic originating and terminating in an American net-
work to be routed abroad. Deliberately manipulating Internet protocols for
subsequent data collection from abroad, even when the manipulation was
performed from within the United States, does not fall under FISA’s defini-
tion of “electronic surveillance.”162 Instead, these manipulations are regu-
lated under the most permissive third legal regime for network surveillance,
EO 12333 (and perhaps further specified in non-public guidelines).163
1. Deliberate BGP Manipulations
Manipulations of the BGP protocol can cause network traffic to take
unusual paths. There have been numerous real-world incidents demonstrat-
ing this, including situations where traffic from two American endpoint
ASes was rerouted through ASes physically located abroad.164 Although
there is no evidence that these incidents were part of a surveillance opera-
tion, or even a clear understanding of why they occurred, it is instructive to
consider them as examples of how government agencies could circumvent
the legal safeguards protecting US persons by forcing their network traffic to
be diverted abroad and intercepting it on foreign soil.
In 2013, global Internet monitoring and research company Renesys ob-
served a number of highly-targeted manipulations of BGP that caused traffic
160. Id.
161. Id.; Geist et al., supra note 159.
162. See supra Parts I.B.2 & I.C.2.
163. See supra Part I.C.
164. For a scientific survey of these issues, see Sharon Goldberg, Why is it taking so long
to secure internet routing?, ACMQUEUE (Sept. 11, 2014), available at http://queue.acm.org/
detail.cfm?id=2668966; Kevin Butler et al., A Survey Of BGP Security Issues And Solutions,
98 PROC. OF THE IEEE 100 (2010). For some real-life examples, see A. Peterson, Researchers
Say U.S. Internet Traffic Was Re-routed Through Belarus. That’s a Problem, WASH. POST,
Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/20/researchers-
say-u-s-internet-traffic-was-re-routed-through-belarus-thats-a-problem/; Declan McCullagh,
How Pakistan knocked Youtube offline (and how to make sure it never happens again, CNET
(Feb. 25, 2008), available at http://www.cnet.com/news/how-pakistan-knocked-youtube-of-
fline-and-how-to-make-sure-it-never-happens-again/; Jim Cowie, China’s 18-minute Mystery,
DYN RESEARCH, November 18, 2010, available at http://www.renesys.com/blog/2010/11/chi-
nas-18-minute-mystery.shtml.
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sent between two American endpoint ASes to be routed through Iceland.165
On August 2, 2013, manipulator AS Siminn in Iceland used BGP to send an
“impersonated route” for an IP address block, allowing Siminn to intercept
traffic sent between two endpoints in Denver, Colorado.166 A summary of
that manipulation is shown in Figure 2, below.
FIGURE 2: ON JUNE 31, 2013, MANIPULATOR AS SIMINN IN ICELAND USED
BGP TO SEND AN “IMPERSONATED ROUTE” FOR IP ADDRESS BLOCK
206.51.69.0/24, ALLOWING SIMINN TO INTERCEPT TRAFFIC SENT






















Traffic, originating at an endpoint physically located in Denver and logi-
cally located inside Atrato’s AS, travels to an Icelandic AS (Siminn) and
then back to its destination (physically located in Denver and logically lo-
cated in Qwest/Centurylink’s AS).168 Renesys also observed an AS based in
Belarus performing similar BGP manipulations.169
Similar incidents have occurred periodically across the Internet.170 In
2010, for example, a routing incident caused traffic sent between multiple
165. See Andrea Peterson, Researchers Say U.S. Internet Traffic Was Re-routed Through
Belarus. That’s a Problem, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH, (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/20/researchers-say-u-s-internet-traffic-was-re-
routed-through-belarus-thats-a-problem.
166. See Cowie, supra note 164. See also USSID 18, supra note 5.
167. See Jim Cowie, The New Threat: Targeted Internet Traffic Misdirection, RENESYS
BLOG (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.renesys.com/2013/11/mitm-internet-hijacking/.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Butler, supra note 164.
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American endpoint ASes to be diverted through China Telecom during a
single eighteen-minute time period.171 In 2008, a presentation at DEF-
CON demonstrated how these manipulations could be performed in a covert
manner.172 This method could be used to confound the network measurement
mechanisms173 that researchers used to detect the 2010 and 2013 incidents
mentioned above.
TARGET OF THE BGP MANIPULATION. Understanding the targets of sur-
veillance informs how the legal framework applies to BGP manipulations
for the purpose of surveillance. The incidents mentioned above are executed
as follows. The manipulating AS depicted in Figure 2 (Icelandic AS Siminn)
manages to divert traffic to itself by sending BGP messages that “imperson-
ate” those sent by the legitimate destination AS (Qwest/Centurylink’s AS) to
carefully selected neighboring ASes.174 Because BGP lacks authentication
mechanisms, these neighbors (Atrato’s AS) accept the BGP message for the
impersonated route, and select the impersonated route.175 The neighbors
(Atrato) then forward their traffic along the impersonated route to the manip-
ulator’s AS (Icelandic AS Siminn).176 The manipulator receives the traffic
and forwards it back to the legitimate destination AS (Qwest/Centurylink)
via a legitimate route.177 The manipulator AS therefore becomes a man-in-
the-middle between the targeted source AS (Atrato) and the destination AS
(Qwest/Centurylink). Although Figure 2 shows traffic between two individ-
ual endpoints within Atrato and Qwest/Centurylink being intercepted by the
BGP manipulation, typically all traffic originating inside Atrato and destined
to the Qwest/Centurylink AS would be intercepted by the manipulator.178
To further understand the targets of this manipulation, we consider what
it means to send BGP messages that “impersonate” a legitimate destination
AS. A BGP message is used to advertise the path to a specific IP address
block hosted by a particular destination AS.179 Each AS is allocated one or
171. Cowie, supra note 164.
172. Anton Kapela and Alex Pilosov, Stealing The Internet, DEFCON 16 (Aug. 10,
2008), available at https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-16/dc16-presentations/defcon-16-
pilosov-kapela.pdf.
173. Typically, researchers identify BGP manipulations using diagnostic tools like tracer-
oute, G. Malkin, Traceroute Using an IP Option, THE INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, (Jan.
1993), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1393, or BGP looking glasses, David Meyer, University of
Oregon Route Views Archive Project, http://www.routeviews.org (last accessed Apr. 28,
2015). However, a clever and dedicated adversary can use various techniques to avoid detec-
tion by these diagnostic tools, as demonstrated by Kapela and Pilosov at DEFCON 2008.
Kapela, supra note 172.





179. An Internet Protocol (IP) address is a numerical address used to identify a particular
device connected to the Internet; IP addresses are 32-bit numbers, divided into four 8-bit octets
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more IP address blocks, used to identify devices operated by that AS.180
Multiple devices can use a single IP address;181 thus, a single IP address can
be used by multiple devices or persons. A separate BGP message is used to
advertise each IP address block allocated to a particular destination AS.182
Sending a BGP message that “impersonates” a legitimate destination AS
means that the manipulator AS (Icelandic AS Siminn) sends a BGP message
that claims a false route to the IP address block (206.51.69.0/24). As shown
in Figure 2, the manipulator AS (Siminn) falsely claims that the IP address
block 206.51.69.0/24 is allocated to Siminn’s own customer AS, the Ice-
landic Opin Kerfi AS 48685. In reality, that IP address block is allocated to
the legitimate destination AS (Qwest/Centurylink). Because BGP lacks
mechanisms that can authenticate allocations of IP address blocks, the ma-
nipulator’s neighbors will accept this impersonated route, and forward all
traffic destined to the IP addresses in the disputed block to the manipulator’s
AS183 (Siminn) instead of the legitimate destination (Qwest/Centurylink).
This impersonated route will continue to propagate through the network as
the ASes that select the impersonated route pass it on to their own neighbors.
The target of this BGP manipulation is 1) all traffic sent by each source
AS that selected the impersonated route (e.g., all traffic from Atrato) that 2)
is sent to IP addresses in the block that the manipulator falsely claims is
allocated to him (e.g., the 256 IP addresses contained in the block
206.51.69.0/24). This has important legal implications: EO 12333’s permis-
sive legal regime applies to these surveillance operations, since they do not
“intentionally” target a “known, particular US person.”184
One question here is whether targeting Atrato or Qwest/Centurylink
could be seen as “intentionally targeting a US person,” which could mean
FISA applies.185 This issue arises because companies may also be recognized
as “US persons” under FISA and EO 12333.186 Although we cannot be fully
(written as, e.g., 206.51.69.201). An IP address block is a set of IP addresses that have a
common n-bit prefix. For example, the set of IP addresses {206.51.69.0, 206.51.69.1, . . .
206.51.69.255} has a common 24-bit prefix. We write this as address block 206.51.69.0/24,
where the notation /24 (“slash twenty four”) implies a common 24-bit prefix (here 206.51.69)
for all addresses in the block. For more details, see Number Resources, INTERNET ASSIGNED
NUMBERS AUTHORITY, https://www.iana.org/numbers (last visited Apr. 29. 2015).
180. Rekhter & Li, supra note 145.
181. See Martin Casado & Michael J. Freedman, Peering through the shroud: The effect
of edge opacity on IP-based client identification, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH USENIX CONFER-
ENCE ON NETWORKED SYS. DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION Fig. 6 (2007), available at http://
dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1973430.1973443.
182. See Rekhter & Li, supra note 145.
183. See Cowie, supra note 167. For a comprehensive view of BGP security, see Sharon
Goldberg, Why is it taking so long to secure internet routing?, QUEUE, Oct. 2014, at 56–63.
184. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012); see supra Part I.C.
185. See supra Part I.C.
186. Corporations have been granted Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906), Fifth Amendment protection
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certain how the intelligence community applies FISA and EO 12333 in prac-
tice, we can use the revealed MUSCULAR program for some clues. MUS-
CULAR operations intercepted Google and Yahoo! traffic from abroad
under EO 12333.187 It follows that the authorities are likely not targeting
these Internet companies directly, but are instead targeting users of these
services that are not yet known. Applying this logic to the Atrato/Qwest/
Centurylink example, the permissive legal regime under EO 12333 is likely
to apply to such situations. This would be one important point to clarify in
any EO 12333 investigation, such as the one announced by the PCLOB.
LOCATION OF THE BGP MANIPULATION. This BGP manipulation, which
involves sending just a single impersonated BGP message from the Icelandic
AS Siminn in Figure 2, is executed entirely outside of the targeted endpoint
ASes (Atrato and Qwest/Centurylink). In fact, it can be executed entirely
abroad. Of course, redactions in USSID 18 and other documents result in
uncertainty with regard to whether EO 12333 applies different regulations to
manipulations conducted domestically versus on foreign soil. However, the
example in Figure 2 indicates that any such legal distinctions would have no
effect on an authority’s ability to collect network traffic.
2. Deliberate DNS Manipulations
Alternatively, one could divert traffic to servers located abroad by
manipulating the Domain Name System (DNS). The DNS is a core Internet
protocol that maps human-readable domain names (e.g., www.facebook.com)
to the IP addresses that identify the servers hosting the domain188 (e.g.,
69.63.176.13). Applications that wish to communicate with the domain www
.facebook.com first perform a “DNS lookup” to learn the IP address of the
server that hosts the domain, and then direct their network traffic to that IP
address.189 DNS lookups for end users and applications within a single AS
are typically performed by a device called a “recursive resolver,” typically
located within the AS.190 Recursive resolvers usually engage in the DNS
protocol with servers located outside their AS, and return responses to DNS
lookups to users and applications within their AS.191
against double jeopardy, United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 572
(1977), Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542
(1970), and First Amendment free speech protections, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
342 (2010). Expanding “these [constitutional] rights has legitimized corporations as constitu-
tional actors and placed them on a level with humans in terms of Bill of Rights safeguards.”
Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights,41 Hastings
L.J. 577, 650–51 (1990).
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See generally CRICKET LIU & PAUL ALBITZ, DNS AND BIND 4–8 (Mike Loukides,
5th ed. 2006).
189. Id.
190. See infra Fig. 3. See also LIU & ALBITZ, supra note 188.
191. LIU & ALBITZ, supra note 188.
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The DNS is well known to be vulnerable to manipulations that subvert
the mapping from a domain name to IP address.192 These manipulations,
which have been observed in the wild as mechanisms for performing net-
work censorship,193 can also be used to redirect network traffic through serv-
ers located abroad. Figure 3, below, presents an example of how DNS
manipulations can be used to direct traffic between two US endpoints (Bos-
ton University and Facebook) abroad. Figure 4, further below, depicts, in
more detail, the DNS manipulation technique labeled (1) in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3: DNS MANIPULATIONS REDIRECTING
DOMESTIC TRAFFIC ABROAD
Facebook traffic 
passed on to real 
facebook server





DNS manipulation from abroad to 
convince resolver that facebook.com 
has IP address 6.6.6.6 
1








Real facebook server 
with IP 69.63.176.13 
4
Facebook traffic 
goes to IP 6.6.6.6
located abroad
5
192. Steve Bellovin, Using The Domain Name System For System Break-Ins, PROC. OF
5TH USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM (1995), available at http://www.cse.iitd.ernet.in/~sbansal/
csl865/readings/bellovin.pdf; Dan Kaminsky, Black Ops 2008: Its The End Of The Cache As
We Know It, BLACK HAT USA (2008), available at https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/
bh-jp-08/bh-jp-08-Kaminsky/BlackHat-Japan-08-Kaminsky-DNS08-BlackOps.pdf; Amir
Herzberg & Haya Shulman, Fragmentation Considered Poisonous, Or: One-Domain-To-Rule-
Them-All.org, 2013 IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORK SECURITY
(2013). Indeed, these vulnerabilities have motivated the development of DNSSEC, a security-
enhanced version of DNS. However, DNSSEC is far from being fully deployed, so these vul-
nerabilities remain exploitable today. Moreover the manipulation presented by Hertzberg and
Shulman circumvents all known protections of DNS (including source port randomization)
apart from full-fledged DNSSEC.
193. Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Internet Filtering In China, IEEE Internet
Computing, 7(2), 70–77 (2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=399920; see also THE OPEN NETWORK INITIATIVE, http://opennet.net/.
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Suppose that a manipulator wants network traffic destined to www
.facebook.com from a given source AS (e.g., Boston University) to be routed
through a foreign server located abroad. Suppose the foreign server has IP
address 6.6.6.6. The manipulator can execute a DNS manipulation that
causes the recursive resolver in the source AS (Boston University) to map
www.facebook.com to IP address 6.6.6.6.194 All network traffic for www
.facebook.com from the source AS (Boston University) will then flow to the
foreign server at IP address 6.6.6.6. Finally, the foreign server will silently
forward the traffic it receives to the real Facebook server at IP address
69.63.176.13.195 Thus, the foreign server becomes a man-in-the-middle for
traffic sent between two US endpoints (Boston University and www
.facebook.com).
TARGET OF THE DNS MANIPULATION. As with manipulations of the BGP
protocol, the surveillance law applied is based on the identity of the target.
The DNS manipulation is more targeted than the BGP manipulation we dis-
cussed earlier: it targets all traffic to a particular domain that is sent by all
users and applications served by the targeted recursive resolver (i.e., within
Boston University’s AS). Meanwhile, the BGP manipulation, discussed
above, collects all the traffic sent between a pair of ASes.
Again, a key question is whether targeting Facebook or Boston Univer-
sity is “intentionally targeting a US person,” since organizations196 can be
“US persons” under FISA and EO 12333.197 The logic from the MUSCU-
LAR operations may apply in this case as well: authorities are not “target-
ing” Facebook or Boston University in the legal sense, but are instead
“targeting” individual users of their Internet services that are not yet
known.198 If the same logic applies as in MUSCULAR, the DNS manipula-
tion is not “intentionally targeting a US person” and is therefore regulated by
the permissive legal regime of EO 12333.199
LOCATION OF THE DNS MANIPULATION. Like the BGP manipulations
discussed earlier, these DNS manipulations can be conducted entirely
abroad. Researchers Amir Hertzberg and Haya Shulman describe a tech-
nique that allows this manipulation to be executed by a device located en-
194. This is a hypothetical example of a well-known attack on DNS. For more specific
examples, see, e.g., Cowie, supra note 167; Bellovin, supra note 192; Kaminsky, supra note
192; Herzberg & Shulman, supra note 192.
195. See LIU & ALBITZ, supra note 188.
196. Any organization can have an AS: it does not have to be a corporation. For example,
a non-profit organization or university can have an AS. Even the George W. Bush Foundation
appears to have its own AS: http://www.tcpiputils.com/browse/as/393327.
197. See supra Part I.
198. See supra Part II.A.
199. We reiterate that we cannot establish with full certainty how the intelligence com-
munity applies FISA and EO 12333 in specific cases. This point could be clarified as part of
any investigation into EO 12333, such as the one announced by the PCLOB.
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tirely outside the targeted source AS.200 The technique is depicted in Figure
4, below.
FIGURE 4. HERTZBERG AND SHULMAN’S TECHNIQUE FOR SUBVERTING THE
DNS MAPPING FOR A DOMAIN.
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Hertzberg and Shulman’s technique subverts the DNS mapping for a
particular domain (www.facebook.com) by using a recursive resolver that
serves a particular target AS (Boston University AS 111).201 The manipula-
tor can be located entirely outside the target AS, and need only send DNS
messages and emails.202 No devices within the target AS need to be
compromised.203
It is important to observe that recursive resolvers usually do not accept
messages from senders outside their AS,204 but mailservers do accept such
messages.205 Thus, a manipulator located outside the target AS can use the
mailserver to attack the recursive resolver. Specifically, the manipulator




204. See LIU & ALBITZ, supra note 188 at 3; OPEN RESOLVER PROJECT, http://
openresolverproject.org/ (last visited May 3, 2015).
205. Mailservers are devices that provide email services for an AS. Therefore, they need
to accept emails from outside the AS. Since emails can come from any AS on the Internet, the
mailservers will accept messages (i.e., emails) from outside their own network. See David
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sends carefully crafted messages to a mailserver located inside the target
AS.206 These messages act as a trigger for the mailserver to send DNS que-
ries to the DNS resolver inside the AS; the DNS resolver accepts messages
from the mailserver, because the mailserver is inside the AS.207 The recur-
sive resolver then proceeds to resolve the mailserver’s DNS queries. To do
this, the recursive resolver sends DNS messages to DNS servers outside the
target AS.208 Finally, the manipulator responds to these DNS messages with
carefully-crafted bogus DNS messages of its own; this allows the manipula-
tor to subvert the recursive resolver’s mapping from a domain name to an IP
address.209 This manipulation only involves sending messages from outside
the AS: no internal devices in the AS need to be compromised. And this
manipulation can also be executed entirely abroad.
3. Other Manipulations
The BGP and DNS manipulations we describe fall outside of the “inten-
tional acquisition” and the “installation of a . . . device” subsection of the
“electronic surveillance” definition under FISA.210 Therefore, such manipu-
lations are likely regulated by the permissive legal regime of EO 12333.
However, protocol manipulations probably do not have to be executed en-
tirely abroad to be regulated under EO 12333.211
Although the BGP and DNS manipulations we described here can be
executed entirely abroad, and thus regulated by EO 12333, manipulations
might be executed on US soil and still regulated by EO 12333. This class of
manipulations includes any network exploit executed by an attacker that
wishes to become a man-in-the-middle on a communication path.
Any domestic exploit may fall into this category, but one particularly
interesting class of manipulations involves hacking into US routers or
switches and installing routes that divert traffic abroad. Recent revelations
suggest that the NSA has the capability to take control of remote routers.212
Crocker, RFC5598: Internet Mail Architecture, THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE
(July 2009), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5598.




210. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2012).
211. To be completely confident that they can also be conducted on US soil under EO
12333, one needs to have complete insight into USSID 18. On the face of it, however, EO
12333 and USSID 18 do not define “targeting” and FISA does not include manipulations
within its scope. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. (1981); USSID 18, supra note 5.
212. The HEADWATER, SCHOOLMONTANA, SIERRAMONTANA, and STUC-
COMONTANA programs are examples of this capability at work. See Jacob Appelbaum,
Judith Horchert & Christian Stöcker, Shopping for Spy Gear: Catalog Advertises NSA Tool-
box, DER SPIEGEL, Dec. 29, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-
nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html; see also Darlene Storm, 17 exploits
the NSA uses to hack PCs, routers and servers for surveillance, COMPUTER WORLD (Jan. 3,
356 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 21:317
The NSA can also physically tamper with US-made routers.213 Another pos-
sibly relevant class of manipulations is the SECONDDATE program, which
the NSA calls “an exploitation technique that takes advantage of web-based
protocols and man-in-the-middle capabilities.”214 Although we are unable to
fully determine the extent to which such capabilities are actually used, based
on the recently increased transparency and our subsequent analysis, we do
see sufficient basis to conclude that the legal and technical possibilities
exist.215
III. POSSIBLE REMEDIES
FOIA REQUESTS. In order to address the loopholes identified in this Arti-
cle, the vast amount of still redacted policy documents—in particular in US-
SID 18—must be addressed. Even though the US government has released
several insightful policy documents in recent months,216 often these docu-
ments refer to redacted or completely classified legal documentation that
cannot be studied. The lack of transparency on surveillance policies limit
policymakers, academics, the general public and even the US Supreme
Court217 from establishing a comprehensive overview of the Fourth Amend-
ment implications of current network surveillance policy.
TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS. Purely technical solutions like encryption, DNS
Security Extensions (DNSSEC), and the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) can also help combat some of the specific risks of the loopholes we
identified. Indeed, the past year has seen a significant increase in efforts to
encrypt Internet traffic. In response to revelations about the MUSCULAR
program, described in Part II.A.1, Google and Yahoo! have moved to en-
crypt the intradomain communication links between their data centers, and a
2014), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2474275/cybercrime-hacking/17-exploits-the-
nsa-uses-to-hack-pcs—routers-and-servers-for-surveillance.html.
213. Glenn Greenwald, Glenn Greenwald: how the NSA tampers with US-made internet
routers, THE GUARDIAN (May 12, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/may/12/
glenn-greenwald-nsa-tampers-us-internet-routers-snowden.
214. Ryan Gallagher & Glenn Greenwald, How The NSA Plans To Infect Millions Of
Computers With Malware, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 12, 2014), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/
2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/.
215. Once again, we are not in a position to establish whether the NSA’s ability to sub-
vert network protocols and routers is actually used in practice to circumvent the statutory and
constitutional protections provided to US persons under the first two legal regimes described.
National security secrecy—not so much on the operational level but at the policy level—still
limits exhaustive independent analysis and evaluation.
216. See USSID 18, supra note 5. Note that dozens of EO 12333-related documents
released in the FOIA case ACLU v. NSA so far do not cover our analysis. Am. Civil Liberties
Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 13-9198(AT) (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
217. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty, 133 S.Ct. 1138 (2013) (dismissing the case due to
lack of standing).
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number of other corporations have followed suit.218 There has also been in-
creased interest in encrypting interdomain traffic between users and web-
sites, through the deployment of the HTTPS protocol for encrypted web
traffic.219 The Internet Architecture Board issued a statement on Internet
confidentiality, indicating that “protocol designers, developers, and opera-
tors [should] make encryption the norm for Internet traffic.”220 And there are
new efforts underway to enable turn-key encryption of websites through the
LetsEncrypt project.221
However, although encryption can certainly thwart attempts to read the
content of collected communications, adoption is still in its infancy. Moreo-
ver, even encrypted traffic exposes “metadata” (e.g., who is communicating,
the length of the communication, timing information, etc.) that can be used
to reconstruct surprisingly detailed information about the contents of the net-
work traffic.222 In addition, FISA and USSID 18 minimization procedures
permit extensive retention and further analysis of encrypted communications
even if two communicants are known to be US persons.223
The RPKI can limit the scope and impact of BGP manipulations, but
cannot completely eliminate them, and it remains far from fully deployed
today.224 DNSSEC can stop the DNS manipulations we described, but it also
218. See EFF’s Encrypt the Web Report, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 4, 2014), https://
www.eff.org/encrypt-the-web-report (The Electronic Frontier Foundation maintains an up-
dated scorecard in which leading Internet companies are rated for their adoption of encryption
policies, including “Encrypts data center links,” “Supports httpS,” “httpS Strict (HSTS),”
“Forward Secrecy,” and “STARTTLS.”).
219. See Herzberg & Schulman, supra note 192.
220. IAB Statement on Internet Confidentiality, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE BD., (Nov. 14,
2014), https://www.iab.org/2014/11/14/iab-statement-on-internet-confidentiality.
221. See, e.g., Alex Halderman, Let’s Encrypt: Bringing httpS to Every Web Site, FREE-
DOM TO TINKER (Nov. 18, 2014), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/jhalderm/announcing-
lets-encrypt.
222. For an extensive body of technical literature on the subject of using “metadata” to
reconstruct information about the contents of encrypted network traffic, see Brad Miller et. al.,
I Know Why You Went To The Clinic: Risks And Realization Of httpS Traffic Analysis, 8555
LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCI. 143, 146-64 (2014). The gist of this technical literature is
that even encryption cannot hide the fact that a user visited the server hosting a particular site.
For example, one might learn the “metadata” that an Internet user visited the server hosting the
site www.hivmedicineinfo.com; this “metadata” immediately leaks information about diseases
that the user might be likely to have, even if the actual pages the user viewed on website are
encrypted.
223. See USSID 18, supra note 5; see also EXHIBIT A, supra note 36; EXHIBIT B, supra
note 36.
224. Danny Cooper et. al., On The Risk Of Misbehaving RPKI Authorities, Proc. 12th
ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, 16(1), 2013; M. Lepinski & S. Kent, RFC 6480:
An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE
(Feb. 2012), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6480.
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has not reached anything near full deployment.225 Moreover, new and ex-
isting technical loopholes will likely continue to be discovered by security
researchers and the intelligence community; thus, reliance on purely techni-
cal solutions alone is not sufficient protection against the legal loopholes we
have identified here.
EXISTING LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES. The legislative initiatives that domi-
nate the headlines in the media (including the proposed USA Freedom Act
that ultimately failed to pass by a handful of votes)226 still concentrate on the
rights of US persons under the Patriot Act and FISA. Thus, they offer little
promise in protecting Americans from the international surveillance loop-
holes for bulk surveillance on Americans under EO 12333. Presidential Pol-
icy Directive 28,227 issued in January 2014, contains some language
concerning the protection of foreigners’ rights, along with a set of purposes
for which foreign intelligence may be collected. However, the legal status of
the Directive relative to the existing framework of US surveillance is un-
clear, and the Directive explicitly states that “this directive is not intended to
alter the rules applicable to US persons in Executive Order 12333, the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or other applicable law.”228 So far, no
substantial changes can be observed since the Directive was released, and
the extent to which the Directive will influence actual surveillance policy
remains to be seen. In contrast, although its implications remain opaque,
§ 309 of the 2014–15 Intelligence Authorization Bill—hastily introduced,
hardly debated and approved within 48 hours before a budgetary deadline
for the new fiscal year passed—seems to lower legal protections for US
persons.229
More fundamentally, the ability to overcome these loopholes is further
constrained by US lawmaking and constitutional traditions. Whereas the Pa-
triot Act and FISA are overseen by all three branches of government, EO
12333 remains solely under the authority of the executive branch (in theory
and most certainly in practice). However, as Article II of the US Constitu-
tion grants the executive branch wide national security authorities, it is likely
that EO 12333 reform will remain an executive affair.
The obstacles impeding long term reform are real. Cross-institutional
checks and balances and independent oversight could remain absent from
EO 12333 policies in the years to come. The PCLOB investigation, an-
225. Wilson Lian et. al., Measuring the Practical Impact of DNSSEC Deployment,
USENIX Security Symposium (2013), available at https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenix-
security13/technical-sessions/paper/lian.
226. See supra text accompanying note 27.
227. Presidential Policy Directive: Signals Intelligence Activities, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-
directive-signals-intelligence-activities.
228. Id. at 9.
229. See supra Part I.C.5.
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nounced on July 23, 2014, is a first step in investigating issues with EO
12333; however, the Board reports directly to the President. So far, the
PCLOB has done little besides issue general statements on the modification
of policies that have been in place since the Reagan era.230 It is too early to
tell exactly what the PCLOB investigation will focus on, let alone what rec-
ommendations will eventually be acted upon by the President. In any event,
the legislative and judicial branches of government have limited theoretical
and practical ability to change the trajectory of EO 12333 reform unless a
court is willing to find the scope of the EO unconstitutional. It is still too
early to determine whether § 309 of the 2014–15 Intelligence Authorization
Act will set a historical legal precedent for more Congressional involvement
or how it will interplay with FISA. But even if the legislative and judicial
branches of government address the loopholes in the Patriot Act and FISA,
the consolidation of the loopholes in EO 12333 continues to expose Ameri-
cans to unrestrained bulk surveillance from abroad.
SHORT-TERM REMEDY: REVISE FISA. An actionable short-term remedy
would update the definition of “electronic surveillance” in FISA.231 First, a
good modification would ensure that the geographical point of collection
does not determine the legal protection offered. Second, the definition of
“electronic surveillance” should be formulated in a technology-neutral fash-
ion, to ensure legal protection continues to apply regardless of the technol-
ogy employed in the surveillance operation. If the legal definition continues
to mention explicitly specific technologies, it will quickly be outpaced by
new technologies and new surveillance capabilities. Finally, the legal defini-
tion of “installing a device” for the purpose of surveillance should be care-
fully reformulated to avoid introducing new loopholes, such as the ones
discussed in Part II.B. Failing to take these issues into account when revising
FISA would continue to leave Americans unprotected against advanced
forms of network traffic collection from abroad. Historically, Congress has
left the critical definition of “electronic surveillance” in FISA untouched for
decades, but perhaps increased public scrutiny could instigate change.
LONG-TERM REMEDY: REVISIT CENTRAL CONCEPTS OF US SURVEIL-
LANCE LAW. Over the long term, effectively closing the identified loopholes
requires a fundamental reconsideration of central concepts of US surveil-
lance law. Questions that need to be raised include whether the point of
collection should continue to determine the applicable legal regime; whether
network traffic collection itself (before a user is “intentionally targeted”)
should constitute a privacy harm; and whether the principle that limits
Fourth Amendment protection to US persons, established in United States v.
230. A full report on EO1233 will come out later. See PCLOB Posts Status of Attorney
General-Approved U.S. Person Procedures Under Executive Order 12333, PRIVACY AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD. (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.pclob.gov/newsroom/20150219
.html.
231. See supra Parts I.B.2 & I.C.2.
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Verdugo-Urquidez and confirmed in Clapper v. Amnesty, effectively pro-
tects Americans on a global Internet.232 As long as these questions remain
unaddressed, the interdependent legal and technical loopholes we identify
leave the door open for the intelligence community to circumvent the Con-
stitution and to conduct largely unrestrained bulk collection of Americans’
Internet traffic from abroad.
CONCLUSION
International communications intercepted on US soil are regulated by
FISA and overseen by Congress and the FISA Court. Revealed surveillance
operations regulated by FISA are the subject of a broad public debate and
are being constitutionally challenged at courts across the United States. By
contrast, however, surveillance of Americans’ traffic, when collected
abroad, is regulated by EO 12333, solely governed and primarily overseen
by the executive branch. An operation can be regulated under EO 12333 if it
is designed to adhere to two main criteria: 1) it does not “intentionally target
a US person” (e.g., bulk surveillance) and 2) it is conducted abroad. EO
12333 and its underlying guidelines (notably, USSID 18) contain permissive
presumptions of foreignness, and as long as users are not intentionally
targeted, operations on foreign soil are presumed to affect foreigners exclu-
sively.233 Since foreigners do not enjoy the legal protections provided by the
Fourth Amendment, conducting operations abroad under EO 12333 enables
the intelligence community to circumvent constitutional and statutory safe-
guards in the Patriot Act and FISA, even when Americans’ data are
intercepted.
Technological developments make these legal loopholes exploitable by
intelligence communities. The vagaries of Internet protocols can sometimes
cause traffic sent between two US endpoints to be routed abroad. Even when
this is not the case, core Internet protocols like BGP and DNS can be delib-
erately manipulated to ensure that traffic between US endpoints takes an
unusual path through a device, under NSA control, located abroad. Recent
months have seen a number of revelations on the technical capabilities of the
US intelligence community, including tapping fiber optic cables and re-
motely controlling routers, which could potentially be used to exploit these
legal loopholes.
232. Justices Brennan and Marshall reject the principle in their Dissenting Opinion to the
ruling. As soon as anyone in the world is affected by conduct of the US government, the
Justices argue, they become “one of the governed” as mentioned by the US Constitution. They
conclude: “when we tell the world that we expect all people, wherever they may be, to abide
by our laws, we cannot in the same breath tell the world that our law enforcement officers need
not do the same [. . .]. We cannot expect others to respect our laws until we respect our
Constitution.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 284, 297 (1990).
233. See supra Part I.C.
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If the two main legal criteria for EO 12333 applicability are met, the
interdependent legal and technical loopholes enable largely unrestrained sur-
veillance on Americans’ Internet communications. For instance, if the afore-
mentioned legal conditions are met, these techniques could be used to
collect, in bulk, all communications sent from an autonomous system, like
Boston University, to a given IP address block (with a BGP manipulation),
or from an autonomous system to a particular domain, like www.facebook
.com (with a DNS manipulation). Indeed, the MUSCULAR opera-
tion demonstrated that collecting network traffic from a US Internet com-
pany (like Google or Yahoo!), in bulk, is not considered by the intelligence
community to “intentionally target a US person” per the FISA definition.
Instead, individual users of these Internet companies’ services were consid-
ered (in the legal sense) the targets of the operations. Because these users
were not specifically targeted at the time the network traffic was collected in
bulk, MUSCULAR was regulated under the most permissive legal regime
for surveillance in the US legal framework (EO 12333 and its underlying
directives, notably USSID 18).234 From these revelations, we infer that the
EO 12333 regime also likely regulates the deliberate network protocol ma-
nipulations (of BGP or DNS) described in Part II.B.
We reiterate that we do not intend to speculate on the extent to which
the intelligence community is exploiting the described loopholes. Instead,
our aim is to broaden the public’s understanding of the possibilities and
deeper issues at hand. Moreover, this analysis of EO 12333’s loopholes is
not exhaustive: this Article focused on bulk surveillance on Americans by
collecting their network traffic abroad. Other types of surveillance opera-
tions not discussed in this Article are also authorized under EO 12333, in-
cluding the deployment of malware.235
This analysis highlights a central problem: the law maintains an old-
fashioned focus on physical materiality. The geographic location of intercep-
tion determines the surveillance laws that apply and the legal protections
afforded to Americans. But global communications networks are not organ-
ized along the lines of traditional geopolitical boundaries to which current
constitutional and statutory protections are tailored. Much of what we have
observed concerns, fundamentally, conventional laws challenged by new
technical realities. Ultimately, conventional laws will likely continue to be
challenged by these new technical realities. If Americans want to bring con-
stitutional protections into the modern age, the US must adapt its legal ap-
proaches to deal with these realities.
234. USSID 18, supra note 5.
235. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. (1981); NSA Documents, supra note 63.

